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Case Comment: Golden Season Pte Ltd and 
others v Kairos Singapore Holdings Pte Ltd and 
another [2015] SGHC 38   
 
This 111-page judgement has highlighted a number of significant points of law 
relating to the treatment of Facebook postings, emails and SMS texts in the tort 
of defamation. They relate primarily to the legal requirements of establishing 
defamatory meaning, reference to the plaintiff and defences. In addition, the 
case examines the awards of general and special damages as well as the viability 
of awarding aggravated damages to corporate plaintiffs. Apart from the 
plaintiff’s actions in defamation and malicious falsehood, the defendant 
successfully counterclaimed for copyright infringement but failed in the action 
based on passing off. This brief case comment focuses on defamation and 
malicious falsehood. 
 
Facts  
 
The first plaintiff company is in the business of providing military and 
humanitarian relief products. The second plaintiff is a company specialising in 
contemporary home décor products and the third plaintiff is the director of 
both the first and second plaintiffs. The first defendant provides inflatable 
boats, marine products and yacht charter services suitable for flood disaster 
relief work.  The second defendant is the director of the first defendant. The 
actions arose out of a dispute relating to the first plaintiff’s purchase of 
inflatable boats and other related equipment from the first defendant for 
donation purposes in aid of the floods in Thailand in 2011. The defendants also 
donated boats and related equipment, which were conveyed to and 
acknowledged by Mercy Relief (an NGO), but the latter’s acknowledgement was 
not made known by the plaintiffs to the defendants. 
 
The defendants made various statements via Facebook, emails and SMS 
messages which, the plaintiffs alleged, were defamatory, in particular, by 
imputing that the plaintiffs were, amongst others, dishonest for selling the 
inflatable boats to Mercy Relief at a profit, for overcharging and improper use 
of donors’ monies.  
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Defamation: The Two Facebook Postings 
 
The two Facebook postings were clearly defamatory based on the 
abovementioned imputations.  The defendants’ second Facebook posting only 
referred to a “third party”. But the third plaintiff, in responding to the 
defendants’ postings, identified himself as the person being referred to in the 
defendants’ postings. The High Court held, however, that the plaintiff's act in 
identifying himself as the person being referred to in the defendants’ 
defamatory posting cannot, on its own, satisfy the requirement of reference to 
plaintiff.   
 
Although the self-identification by the plaintiff cannot be taken into 
consideration for fulfilling the legal requirement under the tort of defamation, 
the second Facebook posting had subsequently confirmed the plaintiff's 
identity (“Dear all, by following on this thread, it seems like the some folks are 
feeling the heat……”). In this connection, George Wei JC made important 
observations on the proper treatment towards the Facebook postings. First, he 
noted that the content of the postings continues to change as threads of 
comments are added. Secondly, his Honour analysed the Facebook posting and 
the accompanying thread of comments as a “conversation” building upon 
previous threads.  Finally, he regarded the  conversation as a “single 
publication” where the subsequent comments belong to a single thread of 
comments originating from the same post. By responding to the third plaintiff’s 
comment, the second defendant was building upon his original post in such a 
way as to confirm the third plaintiff’s identity. Hence, the defendants’ second 
Facebook posting consisting of the thread of comments, as a whole, did 
ultimately refer to the plaintiff. (The defence of fair comment, however, 
defeated the defamation action as the learned judge found that the second 
defendant was merely “expressing his concerns as to what he thought might 
have gone wrong”.) 
 
His Honour’s approach to Facebook postings and the thread of comments is 
common-sensical and comports with reality. His analysis is also consistent with 
the recent case precedents. In Smith v ADVFN Plc [2008] EWHC 1797 at [14], 
the English High Court similarly referred to communications on bulletin boards 
as a “casual conversation”. In the Ontario Superior Court of Justice decision 
of Baglow v Smith 2011 ONSC 5131 at [59] and [60], Internet blogging was 
described as a form of “public conversation” and “live debate” due to its 
contemporaneous nature. (The Court of Appeal for Ontario 
in Baglow v Smith 2012 ONCA 407, however, preferred to leave this issue open 
and suggested that the answer could depend on expert evidence.)  On the issue 
of the postings constituting a single publication, the English High Court 
in McGrath v Dawkins [2012] EWHC B3 (QB) at [53] had also remarked on the 
possible change of meaning ensuing from each contribution of threads of 
comments on website forums and the approach of treating the combination of 
threads as a single publication. 
 
As for the first Facebook posting, there was no reference to the 
plaintiffs.  Further, the plaintiffs could not rely on the second Facebook post to 
establish reference to the plaintiffs in the first Facebook post. The High Court 
applied the general rule in Grappelli v Derek Block (Holdings) Pte Ltd [1981] 1 
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WLR 822 at 825 per Lord Denning that “the inferences which were put upon 
the statements after the publication (by facts subsequently learnt) do not 
render them defamatory in the beginning”. Though Grappelli was, strictly 
speaking, concerned with defamatory meaning, Wei JC appeared to have 
extended the principle to the present case to deny that there was a reference to 
the plaintiff in a posting by recourse to a subsequent posting. 
 
The requirements of defamatory meaning and reference to the plaintiff can 
sometimes intersect. In the interesting case of Samuel Kingsford Budu v The 
British Broadcasting Corporation [2010] EWHC 616, for example, there was 
publication in the form of articles on the web in BBC’s archives and Google 
entries or snippets on a Google page when a search term is entered. The first 
article was defamatory but did not refer to the plaintiff. The second and third 
articles, containing a link to the first article, referred to the plaintiff but had the 
effect of diluting the defamatory meaning in the first article. 
 
Defamation: Emails 
 
The emails sent by the defendant were defamatory of the plaintiffs as they 
imputed that the plaintiffs were, amongst others, dishonest, cheats and in a 
position of conflict of interests.  
 
The defendant raised the defence of qualified privilege. Here the second 
defendant had a legitimate interest to communicate the emails to Mercy Relief 
and the latter had an interest to receive the communications concerning the 
donations of the boats and the discounts the defendants had given to the first 
plaintiff which may not have been extended to Mercy Relief.  In particular, the 
second defendant had an interest to know whether the first defendant had been 
acknowledged for the donations to Mercy Relief. 
 
However, the second defendant’s malice in making the statements defeated the 
defence of qualified privilege. His statements had gone beyond the two matters 
concerning the donations and the discounts given to the first plaintiff for the 
boats.  Moreover, he did not contact the third plaintiff to clarify the issues and 
in fact filed a police report. Hence, the plaintiff’s defamation claims based on 
the emails remained intact. 
 
Defamation: SMS Messages 
 
The SMS text messages were sent by the second defendant to a third party at or 
about the same time and were thus regarded as part of a single communication. 
The messages stated that a police report had been made against the third 
plaintiff, that a defamation suit had been brought by the third plaintiff for 
“300K” followed by the request that the recipient of the SMS texts “be truthful 
and not be afraid” and that “come what may, the truth will be out abt [the third 
plaintiff] and the way he do his business”. 
 
The learned judge found that the communication was not, on the whole, 
defamatory. It only conveyed to the reasonable reader that a serious legal 
dispute between the plaintiff and defendant had arisen out of business 
dealings. Notwithstanding one of the statements that the defendant had 
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reported the third plaintiff to the police, the learned judge concluded that the 
SMS messages as a whole “do not necessarily bear the meaning that [the third 
plaintiff] is guilty of an offence or that there are good grounds to think that an 
offence had been committed”.  
 
Malicious Falsehood 
 
There is no malicious falsehood in respect of either the Facebook posts or the 
SMS texts. As the first Facebook post does not adequately refer to the plaintiffs, 
it is not likely to cause pecuniary damage to the plaintiff, a requirement under 
section 6(1) of the Defamation Act. Section 6(1) reads as follows: 
 
Slander of title, etc. 
 
6.—(1) In any action for slander of title, slander of goods or other 
malicious falsehood, it shall not be necessary to allege or prove 
special damage — 
 
(a) if the words upon which the action is founded are calculated 
to cause pecuniary damage to the plaintiff and are published in 
writing or other permanent form. 
 
Though the second Facebook post was defamatory, there was no malice on the 
part of the second defendant in publishing the post. Hence, no tort of malicious 
falsehood can be made out. 
 
Defamation: General Damages but No Award of Aggravated 
Damages for Corporate Plaintiff 
 
With respect to the defamatory email communications, Wei JC awarded the 
first plaintiff $15,000 for the injury done to its business reputation, and for the 
third plaintiff, $30,000 by way of general damages for the injury to his 
reputation and the consequential injury to his feelings and dignity (ie, 
aggravated damages of $20,000).  The first plaintiff was the main vehicle 
through which the third plaintiff carried out the relevant transactions. To Mercy 
Relief, the first and third plaintiffs were commonly associated with each other. 
The second plaintiff, on the other hand, was hardly mentioned in the chain of 
emails. 
 
As for the claim for special damages, Wei JC noted that there was no evidence 
that the decrease in the first plaintiff’s sales was attributable to the defamatory 
emails. Rather, the court found that Mercy Relief and Singapore Red Cross had 
chosen to stop ordering from the plaintiffs because of complications arising 
from the litigation and the deterioration of ties between the plaintiffs and the 
defendants (see Low Tuck Kwong v Sukamto Sia [2014] 1 SLR 639). 
 
Finally, should corporate plaintiffs be awarded aggravated damages? The Court 
of Appeal in Basil Anthony Herman v Premier Security Co-operative Ltd and 
others [2010] 3 SLR 110 had previously left the issue open. In this regard, Wei 
JC has now decided that a corporate entity cannot and should not be awarded 
aggravated damages since aggravated damages are to be awarded for injury to 
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feelings and pride aggravated by the defendant’s conduct. His Honour noted 
that the English High Court decision of Messenger Newspapers Group Ltd v 
National Graphical Association [1984] 1 All ER 293, which 
purportedly awarded aggravated damages to a corporate plaintiff, was in fact 
based on the need to punish the defendant for his deliberate wrong doing (ie, 
exemplary damages) and not in respect of injury to feelings. Exemplary 
damages tend to be limited to cases where the defendant publishes the 
defamatory statement, which he knows to be false or is reckless as whether it is 
true or false, and with the expectation of obtaining profits as a result of the 
publication. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The High Court’s analysis of Facebook postings and the accompanying thread 
of comments as a form of “conversation” and as constituting a single 
publication for purposes of defamation law have been particularly instructive. 
In addition, the erstwhile uncertainty as to whether aggravated damages may 
be awarded to corporate plaintiffs in the tort of defamation has now been 
clarified by the High Court. It remains to be seen if the Court of Appeal will 
revisit this issue in the near future. 
 
 
Gary Chan Kok Yew (Associate Professor, Singapore Management University) 
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